



cryptech.is

IEPG Berlin 2016

NOW AND THEN, I ANNOUNCE "I KNOW YOU'RE LISTENING" TO EMPTY ROOMS.



IF I'M WRONG, NO ONE KNOWS.
AND IF I'M RIGHT, MAYBE I JUST FREAKED
THE HELL OUT OF SOME SECRET ORGANIZATION.

<https://xkcd.com/525/>

What?

cryptech.is is an effort to create an open hardware cryptographic engine design and the tools needed to make it trustworthy.

Why?

RFC 7258/BCP 188


Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack

Who?

cryptech.is is a loose international collective of engineers trying to improve assurance and privacy on the Internet. It is funded diversely and is administratively quartered outside the US.




DuckDuckGo

A horizontal yellow arrow pointing to the right, representing a timeline. Three callout boxes are connected to the arrow by thin lines. The first callout is at the start, the second is in the middle, and the third is towards the end.

2014-12-04:
Kickoff meeting in
Stockholm

2016-07-15: Alpha
board launch in
Berlin

2015-7-18: Cryptech
hack day in Prague
- first touch on
novena





<https://xkcd.com/824/>

Cheap, fast, stable


- Cheap to produce
- Hard to attack
- IPR-unencumbered






**Method for seeding a pseudo-random
number generator with a cryptographic
hash of a digitization of a chaotic
system**

US 5732138 A





google patent search

← → ↻  <https://www.google.se/#tbm=pts&q=random+number+generator>



random number generator




All Images Videos Apps More ▾ Search tools

About 7 840 000 results (0,63 seconds)

Only noisy diode good
(because the patent already expired)

Cheap, fast, stable


- Many many diodes to choose from
- Really really cheap
- Still quite hard to get it right...




Entropy

1. Pick a source (only noisy diode good)
2. Methodology - free running counter @50 MHz, sample LSB on noise flanks. Not ADC.
3. Sample without introducing artifacts (ARM DMA timer capture / FPGA)
4. De-correlate samples in software (whitening, lossy processing)


Noise generator




Amplifier




Digitizer





Noise-board on-a-Pi

And now...





Tamper MCU (8 bit ATtiny)

Dedicated management USB

512 Mbit SDRAM

PCB rev.03

S1




Another 512 Mbit
SDRAM

Cortex M4,
180 MHz

Noisy diode entropy
source (w shielding)

Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA

Power regulator
(not the least important bit by far)



FPGA vs CPU

Why not spend \$ on bigger CPU?

- FPGA gives you some benefits
 - constant-time implementations of crypto
 - no pointers or stack corruption
- Do you want your HSM to have an HDMI interface and a sound card?

Trade-off isn't clear.

Part of the goal of the alpha is to figure this stuff out...

Do you ~~need~~ want one?

<https://www.crowdsupply.com/cryptech/open-hardware-security-module>

Maybe, if you...

- use HSMs today but think they are too ...
 - expensive
 - complex
 - untrustworthy
 - ...
- don't use HSMs today but think you probably should/might want to
- have an application that needs to run custom code inside the trust boundary
- are looking for a platform for Verilog crypto primitives
- *want to reuse one of our designs but need a “dev board” to play with first*
- **want to help us make cryptech better!**

What it is not

- Production ready (but it might still be useful in your lab setup)
- Fast (but that will improve)

n€xt

- Make the FPGA pay for itself
- Work on tamper circuitry
- More features in the pkcs11 interface